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Abstract. A single equation model is inadequate to capture the various transmission
channels linking civil war to per-capita income. Therefore, this paper uses a system of four
equations to estimate the economic cost of civil con￿ ict. In the system, con￿ ict is allowed
to a⁄ect per-capita income both directly and indirectly through its e⁄ect on a set of ￿deep
determinants￿of income. Estimates indicate that the income loss associated with con￿ ict is
economically sizeable and that slightly less than half of this loss arises from the deterioration
of institutions. Eventually, the economy rebounds, recovering about one half of the initial
loss.
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11. Introduction
The analysis of the economic costs of large scale and organized violence is a lively area of
research, as the recent surveys of Blattman and Miguel (2010), Bozzoli et al. (2010), and
Skaperdas (2011) clearly suggest. From an empirical perspective, three main methodological
approaches have been explored.1 A ￿rst group of papers makes use of accounting methods
to compute the direct cost of violence; that is, the budgetary cost, such as the increase in
military expenditure and the decrease in taxation, or the cost of the destroyed infrastructures
(Bruck 2001, Fitzgerald et al. 2001, and Collier et al. 2003). In order to provide a more
comprehensive estimate of indirect costs, including the loss of economic growth and income,
a second group of papers compares the actual performance of countries a› icted by con￿ ict
against a counterfactual performance derived from similar, non-con￿ ict, countries (Stewart et
al. 2001) or arti￿cially constructed benchmarks (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). A related
approach exploits events such as cease-￿res and truces in war-torn countries to construct
natural experiments and analyze how the dynamics of relevant macro variables di⁄er between
times of violence and times of peace (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003 and Chen et al. 2007).
Finally, a third group of papers employs standard regression analysis to estimate the marginal
e⁄ect of the frequency and intensity of violence on the economic variables of interest, such
as growth, income, and physical or human capital (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008, Collier
1999, Blomberg et al. 2004, Cerra and Saxena, 2008, Miguel and Roland, 2006, and Lopez
and Wodon, 2005). This paper ￿ts within this third group. Its main contribution is to
extend the conventional analysis, based on a reduced-form equation, by estimating a system
of equations that model di⁄erent transmission channels.
More speci￿cally, the existing evidence from regression analysis is typically based on the
1 For a detailed technical review of the methods for measuring the aggregate costs of con￿ ict see Gardeazabal
(2010).
2estimation of the following single equation model:
yit = ￿wit + ￿
0zit + "it (1)
where y is the variable of interest (the level or the growth rate of per-capita GDP in
most applications), w is a proxy for violence, z = [z1;z2;:::zs] is a set of controls (including
a constant term), " is an error term, i is a generic country, t denotes time, and ￿ and
￿ = [￿1;￿2:::￿s] are the parameters to be estimated. The estimation of a regression of this
type faces two complications. One is that violence is most likely endogenous to income (or
growth). The other is that violence potentially a⁄ects several of the controls in z. Some
important progress in the treatment of the endogeneity has been recently made by Yamarik
et al. (2010). The second complication instead has been systematically neglected. The
problem is that if violence a⁄ects y through its e⁄ect on z, then the parameter ￿ only
captures the "residual" direct e⁄ect of violence and not its full economic cost. A possible
solution (see for instance Collier, 1999) is to exclude from equation (1) those controls that
are likely to account for the transmission of the e⁄ect of violence. This, however, might lead
to omitted variables and hence biased estimates.
A more appropriate modelling strategy is to represent the set of structural relations that
link violence to income and its determinants using a system of equations. To this purpose,
the paper estimates a system of the following general form:2
gj;it = ￿
0
jxj;it + ￿j;it (2)
2 While there are several examples of applications of system estimation to macro-development issues (see,
inter alia, Lundberg and Squire, 2003; Imbs, 2004; Carmignani, 2008 and 2011; Huang et al. 2009), to the
best of author￿ s knowledge only Gupta et al. 2004 explore the system approach to study the e⁄ects of war.
However, their paper focuses on one channel of transmission only (￿scal policy) and does not tackle the issue
of endogeneity.
3where j = 1:::m is an index that denotes variables and parameters in the jth equation
and M is the total number of equations in the system, gj, xj, and ￿j are the dependent
variable, the set of regressors, and the error term in the jth equation, respectively, i indexes
countries and t is the time index as before, ￿j are the parameters to be estimated, and
E[￿j;it;￿l;it] 6= 0 for j 6= l. The system consists of four equations (i.e. M = 4). The four
dependent variables are per-capita income and three of its "deep determinants", namely trade
integration, education, and institutional quality (a fourth deep determinant, geography, is
included as a regressor, but treated as exogenous). While xj di⁄ers across equations, the
proxy for violence w is included as a regressor in each equation. In this way, w is allowed
to a⁄ect per-capita income both directly and indirectly through its e⁄ect on the other deep
determinants.
Large scale violence comes in di⁄erent forms, including internal and international con-
￿ ict and terrorism. The focus of this paper is on civil war, de￿ned as an armed con￿ ict that
involves military action internal to the metropole, with active participation of the national
government, an e⁄ective resistance by both sides, and at least 25 battle related deaths a year
including military personnel and civilians. The frequency of occurrence of this type of orga-
nized violence has increased signi￿cantly through the last six decades. The Uppsula/PRIO
Armed Con￿ ict Dataset3 lists 265 civil wars since the end of World War II, 111 of which
involved more than 1000 battle related deaths. Fearon and Laitin (2003) report that the
death toll of civil wars is at least ￿ve times as large as the death toll of interstate wars.
About half of all nations have been a› icted by at least one civil war and more than 70
nations have su⁄ered a civil war with more than 1000 battle related deaths a year. Most
of these war-torn countries are developing economies and civil war has indeed been often
3 This is one of the most popular con￿ ict datasets, jointly provided by the Uppsala Con￿ ict Data Program
and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. See Gleditsch et al. (2002).
4indicated as the main constraint on development and poverty reduction (see Rodrik, 1999
and World Bank, 2011)4 . The question of how civil war a⁄ects income and development is
therefore not just academically pertinent, but also relevant from a policymaking perspective.
The estimation results indicate that civil war negatively a⁄ects per-capita income both
directly and indirectly via the disruption of institutions. Civil war also reduces international
trade integration, but trade does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect per-capita income after controlling
for other determinants. Conversely, schooling appears to be a determinant of per-capita
income, but it is not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by civil war. Quantitatively, the marginal e⁄ect
of civil war is quite large: one year of war (causing 1000 battle related deaths) in a given
quinquennium t reduces average per-capita income in that quinquennium by approximately
15% (the exact percentage depending on which regression model is used as the benchmark for
calculations). The transmission via institutions accounts for at most one half of this income
loss, while the rest is the residual direct e⁄ect after controlling for other possible transmission
channels. These negative e⁄ects, however, are not strongly persistent and the economy
seems to rebound already in the subsequent quinquennium t + 1. The cumulated e⁄ect in
quinquennium t + 2 is still negative, but signi￿cantly smaller than the contemporaneous
e⁄ect in quinquennium t. Finally, contrary to some recent evidence, the spatial dimension
of civil con￿ ict does not seem to be particularly relevant here; that is, con￿ icts occurring
in neighbor countries do not signi￿cantly worsen domestic per-capita income or its deep
determinants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the modelling strategy.
Sections 3 and 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. De￿nitions, sources,
and summary statistics are provided in the Appendix.
4 Carmignani and Gauci (2010) document a very strong negative correlation between occurrence of civil war
and the Human Development Index ranking.
52. Modelling strategy
2.1 Theoretical premise
In this paper, the cost of civil war is represented by a decrease in the level of per-capita
income. The focus is on the level rather than the growth rate of per-capita income because,
as noted by Hall and Jones (1999), the level more than the growth rate captures the di⁄er-
ences in long-run economic performance that most directly relate to welfare as measured by
consumption of goods and services5 . A theory of how civil war is going to a⁄ect the level
of per-capita income is therefore necessary to inform the econometric modelling strategy. In
particular, such a theory should provide guidance on (i) how to represent the determinants
of per-capita income and (ii) how civil war might impact on these determinants.
From a theoretical standpoint, the simplest description of per-capita income is probably
a neoclassical production function of the type y = f(A;k), where y is per-capita income, k
is per-capita physical capital, A is the level of technology, and f(￿) is a continuous concave
function with standard neoclassical properties. This description leads to an accounting
decomposition where di⁄erences in per-capita income across countries (and/or over time) are
due to di⁄erences in per-capita physical capital and di⁄erences in the level of productivity.
So, physical capital and productivity can be seen as the "proximate" determinants of per-
capita income. However, the econometric model ought to focus on the representation of the
"deep" determinants of per-capita income; that is, those factors that drive the di⁄erences in
the proximate determinants.
While there are certainly many candidates, the deep determinants that most often re-
cur in the existing literature are: geography, institutions, trade integration, and education.
5 This focus on level is now well established in the applied macroeconomic literature, see for instance,
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004), Glaeser et al. (2004), Nunn (2008), Battacharrya, (2009), and
Alexeev and Conrad (2009).
6Their role as potential drivers of income and development has been widely investigated in
previous work.6 In a nutshell, a more favorable geography, better institutions, greater
economic integration, and a more educated population should all contribute to increasing
per-capita income. Geography determines natural resource endowments, quality of soil, cli-
mate, and disease environment. These factors are then linked to income through multiple
channels. For instance, natural resources are a potential source of income, but their abun-
dance can crowd-out investment in other sectors and in education. The quality of soil and
the climate in￿ uence the productivity of land, while the disease environment a⁄ects the
productivity of labour. Institutions determine agents￿incentive to participate in economic
activities (i.e. investing, producing, consuming) by setting the context within which eco-
nomic interactions take place. Economic integration a⁄ects the extent to which a country
can bene￿t from knowledge spillovers, externalities, and capital in￿ ows. Finally, education
produces signi￿cant externalities in terms of more benign politics and a better quality of the
labour force.
Given a representation of per-capita income as a function of the deep determinants, the
next step is to consider how civil war might a⁄ect these determinants. Geography is generally
regarded as exogenous and therefore independent from civil war. In fact, while international
armed con￿ ict might impact on country￿ s land area or access to the sea, internal con￿ ict is
unlikely to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on most geographical characteristics. Conversely, there
are solid reasons to believe that civil war in￿ uences the other three deep determinants.
Internal con￿ ict hinders trade routes, disrupts infrastructures, and creates uncertainty and
insecurity, thus scaring away international trade partners and investors. Its negative e⁄ects
on trade and capital ￿ ows are therefore potentially very large.7 A civil war also causes
6 See for instance Rodrik (2002), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2004)
7 There is a large body of research that studies the e⁄ect of international con￿ ict on trade and integration
(see Glick and Taylor 2010 for a recent contribution). Speci￿c evidence on the negative e⁄ect of internal
7the government to lose its legitimacy, thus exacerbating political and social divisions, and
ultimately resulting in the disintegration of domestic institutions.8 In times of civil con￿ ict,
the revenues of the government decline while more resources are needed to ￿nance military
expenditure. This in turn leads to a large reduction in the supply of public goods, including
education. Moreover, disruption of public education infrastructures and the injuries and
deaths to educators further contribute to lowering the rate of human capital accumulation.
All in all, civil war is expected to lower per-capita income by adversely a⁄ecting institutional
quality, trade integration, and/or education.
Two additional considerations complete this theoretical premise. One concerns the pos-
sible interrelations between deep determinants. More speci￿cally, geographical factors may
in￿ uence trade integration, institutional quality, and education. For instance, geographi-
cal distance and physical connectivity reduce economic integration regardless of a country￿ s
trade policy. A bad disease environment might have prevented colonizers from settling down,
thus leading to the creation of extractive, low quality, institutions that have then persisted
until today (see also Subsection 2.4). Resource abundance may discourage human capi-
tal accumulation by causing the economy to overdepend on the resource sector, which is
not intensive in skilled labour and therefore does not o⁄er high returns to investment in
education. The second relevant consideration is the possibility that civil war a⁄ects per-
capita income directly; that is, not just via its impact on institutional quality, education,
or trade integration. A candidate explanation for this direct e⁄ect is that civil war disrupts
infrastructures and equipment (that is, physical capital), thus compromising the production
process and distorting the allocation of inputs. In this sense, civil war could directly a⁄ect
con￿ ict on international trade is provided by Rupert (2004) and Magee and Massoud (2011)
8 On the adverse e⁄ects of civil war on the social fabric, see, inter alia, World Bank (2003). The views in
the literature are not unanimous and some papers suggest that civil wars might lead to state-building and
greater political mobilization. See for instance Bellows and Miguel (2006). In this case, the institutional
channel would transmit a positive e⁄ect of war on income.
8the proximate determinants of income.
This theoretical premise gives rise to the following set of structural relations:
y = fy(p;k;q;hy;w) (3)
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where y is per-capita income, p denotes economic integration with the rest of the world,
q is institutional quality, k is education, h is a vector of geographical characteristics hj
and cj are sets of geographical variables and other exogenous regressors, respectively, in
equation j (j = y;p;k;q), w denotes war, fj(￿) is a continuous, di⁄erentiable function. The






















The positive sign of the derivatives in (5) re￿ ects the view that per-capita income should
positively depend on economic integration, human capital accumulation, and institutional
quality (after accounting for the impact of geography). The negative sign of the derivatives
in (6) follows from the argument that civil war disrupts integration, human capital, and
institutions (again, after controlling for the impact of geography and other possible deter-
minants of p, k, and q). The three transmission channels of the e⁄ect of w on y through p,
k, and q are therefore expected to work in the same direction as the direct e⁄ect, leading
9to the unambiguous prediction that the aggregate e⁄ect of civil war on per-capita income is
negative.
2.2 Econometric model
The econometric representation of the structural equations (3) and (4) is as follows:


























where i denotes country and t time, y;q;k;p are the empirical proxies for, respectively,
per-capita income, institutional quality, education, and integration, w is the empirical proxy
for civil con￿ ict, z = [q;k;p], xy; xq, xk, and xp are vectors of geographical variables and
other exogenous controls, ", ￿q, ￿k, and ￿p are error terms, and ￿, ￿, ￿q, ￿k, ￿p, ￿q, ￿k, ￿p,
￿, ￿q, ￿k, and ￿p are the parameters to be estimated. Equation (7) expresses per-capita
income as a function of its deep determinants. The other equations allow civil war to a⁄ect
per-capita income via its e⁄ect on the deep determinants. The inclusion of w directly as a
regressor in equation (7) is meant to capture the residual e⁄ect of civil war on per-capita
income after controlling for the transmission via institutional quality, education, and trade
integration.
10This empirical speci￿cation adds an important element to the set of structural relations
discussed in Subsection 2.1. For r > 0, civil war is allowed to a⁄ect per-capita income and
its deep determinants with a lag. While the theoretical arguments previously discussed are
essentially static, the e⁄ects of civil war are likely to be dynamic in the sense that they
extend beyond the period when the con￿ ict occurs. The cumulated e⁄ect (z) of civil war














where ￿q, ￿k, and ￿p are the coe¢ cients of q, k, and p in equation (7).
2.3 Estimation and data issues
Equations (7), (8), (9), and (10) can be estimated either separately equation-by-equation
or jointly as a system. By allowing the errors across equations to be correlated, the system
approach should produce more e¢ cient estimates. However, if one of the equations in the
system is misspeci￿ed, then the other equations will also be a⁄ected. Given that it is di¢ cult
to establish unambiguously the superiority of one approach over the other, it is probably best
to use both and see how results change. Accordingly, the four equations are ￿rst estimated
individually by 2SLS and then jointly by GMM.
Estimates are based on a panel of 85 countries over the period 1960-2005. Data are
averaged over sub-periods of ￿ve years, so that there are at most nine observations per
country, even though the panel is unbalanced. This panel structure has some important
advantages over a pure cross-section. For instance, with the panel it is possible to assess the
impact of civil war at di⁄erent lags. At the same time, the focus of the paper on development
e⁄ects makes annual data rather unattractive as they tend to incorporate signi￿cant short-
11term noise. Five year averages therefore represent a compromise between the need to have
a time series dimension (in addition to the cross-section dimension) and the need to smooth
away short-term ￿ uctuations to focus on medium-long term e⁄ects.9
The empirical proxy for per-capita income is (the log of) per-capita GDP. Institutional
quality is measured by the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply. This
ratio is an indicator of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights
(see Clague et al. 1999) that has two important advantages over other popular measures of
institutions. First, it is an objective (as opposed to subjective) indicator. Second, it can be
easily constructed for long time periods and for most countries. Education is proxied by the
total years of formal schooling of the average individual in the population (Barro and Lee,
2010). Finally, trade integration is measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to total
GDP (Rodrik et al. 2004).
The civil war variable w is de￿ned as the number of years of civil war in country i
in quinquennium t weighed by the corresponding battle related deaths (in thousands of
casualties). Combining duration and intensity in the same measure is important because
the two dimensions are not necessarily always correlated. For instance, the three year civil
war between the Ethiopian government and the EPRDF military faction (1989-1991) caused
an estimated 41901 battle related deaths. Around the same period, there were civil wars
in Georgia and Haiti that also lasted for three years, but which only caused an estimated
303 and 492 battle related deaths respectively. If the variable w were only coded in terms
of duration, then the Ethiopian civil war would have the same intensity as the Georgian
and Haitian wars, even though it caused 40000 deaths more and was therefore much more
disruptive. The data on duration and battle deaths needed to construct the war variable are
9 Admittedly, there is not a strong argument to prefer ￿ve year averages to, say, ten year averages. Albeit
quantitatively di⁄erent from those reported in this paper, the results obtained with ten year averages tell a
qualitatively similar story.
12taken from the Uppsula/PRIO armed con￿ ict dataset (see Gleditsch et al. 2002).10
2.4 Identi￿cation and speci￿cation tests
To deal with the endogeneity issue, suitable instruments for the civil war variable must be
identi￿ed. While the instrumentation of income in regressions where war is the dependent
variable has been systematically addressed in recent contributions (Miguel et al. 2004, Cic-
cone, 2008, Besley and Persson, 2008), the instrumentation of civil war in income regressions
is still quite an unexplored territory. Yamarik et al. (2010) devise an identi￿cation strategy
that uses geographic, historical and political factors as the sources of exogenous variation in
the probability of con￿ ict. In fact, geographical factors appear to be a particularly promising
instrument: they are most likely to be exogenous to economic outcomes and there is now
growing evidence that they do play a signi￿cant role in explaining the likelihood of con￿ ict
(see Fearon and Laitin, 2003). More speci￿cally, factors like a rough terrain, a wide land
area, and the presence of a territorial base separated from the state￿ s center by a physical
barrier (i.e. water or distance) are all factors that should increase the likelihood and duration
of a civil war as they make it easier for rebels to hide and more di¢ cult for the government
to patrol, control, and prevent rebellious activities. Drawing on these arguments, three can-
didate instruments are considered: (i) the variable non contiguous is a dummy that takes
the value of one if the state has a non-contiguous territory and zero otherwise, (ii) elevation
di⁄erence measures the di⁄erence (in meters) between the highest and the lowest points of
a state, and (iii) land area is simply (the log of) the area of a country, expressed in km2.
In fact, in addition to civil war, the deep determinants p;q;and k in equation (7) may also
10An alternative data source is the Correlates of War (COW) project (see Singer and Small, 1994). The
correlation between the war variable coded from the Uppsula/PRIO database and the war variable coded
from the COW project is 0.89. For a discussion on the main sources of data and correlation coe¢ cients
across datasets, see Sambanis (2004).
13be endogenous to y due to measurement errors, omitted variables, or even reverse causality.
These variables are then instrumented as follows. Starting with institutional quality, a ￿rst
possible instrument comes from the work of La Porta et al. (1999). They argue that the
legal tradition of a country signi￿cantly a⁄ects the balance of power between the individuals
and the State, thus determining the degree of protection of citizens￿economic rights against
the interference of the government. This suggests instrumenting institutional quality with a
set of dummy variables that capture di⁄erences in legal origins. Alternatively, Acemoglu et
al. (2001) develop a theory of institutions that links the quality of current institutions to the
disease environment and the mortality rate of the colonizers. In countries where the disease
environment was particularly di¢ cult, high mortality induced colonizers not to settle down,
which in turn meant that they had no interest to establish good institutions. Conversely,
in countries with a favorable disease environment, colonizers decided to settle down and
therefore tried to reproduce the (good) institutions they had back home. Colonial institutions
have then persisted over time, meaning that in countries with a worse disease environment
institutions are of a poorer quality. This theory provides two candidate instruments: the
rate of settler￿ s mortality and the quality of the disease environment, which can be proxied
by the malaria ecology indicator discussed in Sachs (2003). It turns out that of all these
possible instruments, malaria ecology has indeed the strongest statistical performance.
Trade integration is instrumented by a measure of country i0s remoteness. This measure
of remoteness is computed as the weighted average of the log of the bilateral distance between
country i and every other country in the sample, with weights equal to the log of aggregate
GDP of the other country. The rationale for the use of this instrument draws on the results
of gravity models (Frankel and Rose, 2002). In the typical gravity model, the intensity
of trade between any two countries is decreasing in their distance and increasing in their
14economic size. Therefore, more distant and economically smaller countries are expected
to trade less than closer and bigger countries. This implies that, in aggregate, the more
distant from large economies country i is, the smaller its degree of trade integration should
be. There are, of course, other exogenous determinants of trade integration that might
work well as instruments. A simple option would be to use some summary measure of
physical connectivity with the rest of the world. A typical example is a dummy variable for
landlocked countries. However, as discussed below, the landlocked status appears to a⁄ect
per-capita income not just through its e⁄ect on trade integration, meaning that one of the
conditions for a valid instrument is likely to be violated. Another option is to ￿t a fully
￿ edged gravity equation to obtain predicted trade shares for each country. As a matter
of fact, some sensitivity checks using the predicted trade shares from Frankel and Romer
(1999) was conducted. Results were largely una⁄ected, but speci￿cation tests indicated
that the predicted shares performed marginally less well as instruments than the measure
of remoteness. Finally, the equation-by-equation estimates reported below indicate that the
genetic similarity between country i and the rest of the world signi￿cantly a⁄ects country
i￿ s degree of trade integration. Drawing on this result, a measure of genetic distance is used
as an instrument (in addition to remoteness) in the system estimation.
The instrument for education is the degree of ethnic fragmentation. Several papers have
indeed highlighted the adverse e⁄ects that ethnic fragmentation is likely to have on the sup-
ply of public goods and services, including education (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina
et al. 1999 and 2000). However, ethnic fragmentation may also a⁄ect other determinants
of income. For instance, in Easterly and Levine (1997), but also in La Porta et al. (1999),
ethnicity signi￿cantly drives institutional quality. Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) show
the important role of ethnicity in determining the onset of insurgency. These results would
15invalidate the exclusion restrictions implied by the use of ethnic fragmentation as an instru-
ment for education. In fact, in the speci￿c case of the sample used in this paper, ethnic
fragmentation seems to be a good instrument for education. All the speci￿cation tests (see
below) suggest that, when instrumented by ethnic fragmentation, education is identi￿ed
(and not just weakly identi￿ed). More importantly, ethnic fragmentation is not signi￿cant
in a regression of institutional quality and is also not signi￿cant in a regression of the war
variable on geographical characteristics, per-capita GDP, and other potential determinants
of con￿ ict11 . This lack of signi￿cance in turn con￿rms that the exclusion restrictions are
most likely valid.
To assess the validity of the instruments, several diagnostic tests are reported. The LM
version of the Kleibergen-Papp rk is used to perform a test of identi￿cation in the presence
of non i.i.d. errors. Under the null hypothesis, the matrix of reduced form coe¢ cients on
the excluded instruments has rank equal to the number of endogenous regressors minus one
and hence the model is underidenti￿ed. Rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is
full column rank and hence that the equation is identi￿ed (see Kleibergen-Paap, 2006). The
Hansen J statistic performs a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the exclusion restrictions
implied by the choice of instruments are correct. Non rejection of the null can be therefore
taken as evidence that the instruments are exogenous and valid (see Hayashi, 2000 for
further discussion). Lastly, the Angrist-Pischke ￿rst-stage chi-squared and F statistics are
tests of underidenti￿cation and weak identi￿cation, respectively, of individual endogenous
regressors. The null hypothesis is that the particular endogenous regressor is underidenti￿ed
(chi-squared statistic) or weakly identi￿ed (F statistic). Rejection of the null therefore
provides further support to the instrument selection (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Critical
11Results are available from the author upon reqeust.
16values for the F statistic are not available, but it can be compared against the critical values
computed by Stock and Yogo (2005). Alternatively, one can refer to a commonly cited rule
of thumb that the F statistic should be greater than 10 for weak identi￿cation not to be a
problem.
3. Equation-by-equation estimates
This section presents the results obtained from2SLS applied equation-by-equation. Through-
out this section, the lag parameter r is set equal to zero. Dynamic speci￿cations are estimated
in the next section.
3.1 Income equation
The estimates of the income equation (7) are reported in Table 1. This is in fact the
type of reduced form equation that most papers estimate to assess the economic cost of civil
con￿ ict. However as stressed in Section 2, the estimated coe¢ cient of the war variable in this
equation only captures the residual direct e⁄ect of con￿ ict; that is, the e⁄ect after controlling
for the impact of the other deep determinants. The reduced form equation therefore does
not provide any information on the indirect e⁄ect that con￿ ict has on income through its
e⁄ect on the deep determinants.
Column I of Table 1 reports the baseline model, with the institutional variable instru-
mented by malaria ecology. Geography is captured by a measure of distance from the
equator. It appears that both institutional quality and education positively a⁄ect per-capita
income. Trade integration and geography instead do not seem to matter. This "primacy"
of institutions is indeed in line with previous ￿ndings reported by Rodrik et al. (2004).
The residual direct e⁄ect of civil war is negative, signi￿cant, and economically quite large:
17one additional year of war that causes 1000 battle related deaths12 reduces the average
per-capita GDP in the quinquennium by about 8%. The diagnostics tests reported at the
bottom of the table generally indicate that the instruments are valid.
The other columns extend the baseline estimates in various directions. In Column II,
the set of geographical variables is enlarged to include a dummy variable for landlocked
countries and a dummy variable for high natural resource intensity. Both these new variables
are strongly signi￿cant. Of particular interest is the positive coe¢ cient of the resource
intensity dummy as it implies that natural resources are likely to be a blessing rather than
a curse. This ￿nding is consistent with the recent evidence on the development impact
of natural resources (see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008 and Alexeev and Conrad, 2009).
The coe¢ cients of the other variables of the equation are not qualitatively changed. In
particular, the coe¢ cient of the civil war variable is practically the same as in Column I. In
Column III, institutional quality is instrumented by legal origins rather than malaria ecology.
While the estimated coe¢ cients of all the regressors are qualitatively very similar to those in
Columns I and II, the null hypothesis of the test of overidentfying restrictions is rejected at
the 10% con￿dence level (but not at the 5% and 1% con￿dence levels). In Column IV both
instruments (malaria ecology and legal origins) are used and again the Hansen J statistic
is not particularly satisfactory. This is taken as evidence that statistically malaria ecology
appears to work better than legal origins as instrument for institutional quality.13
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
12Because the war variable consists of duration and number of deaths, the marginal e⁄ect must be referred
to both a duration measure (one year) and a death toll measure (1000 deaths). The number of 1000 deaths
is used because this is the average death toll in war torn countries in this sample. That is, when a civil war
occurs, on average it causes about 1000 deaths per year in this sample.
13The income equation was also re-estimated with institutions instrumented by the settler￿ s mortality rate
of Acemoglu et al. (2001). Results are available upon request. In a nutshell, the coe¢ cients of all variables
are similar to those in Column I. The Angrist-Pischke F statistics is however slightly smaller than 10, which
might indicate a weak instrument problem.
18An obvious generalization of equation (7) should allow for mean reversion in per-capita
income:








Equation (12) is equivalent to a growth regression with a conditional convergence term.
In fact, it should be noticed that instrumental variable estimation of the equation (7) still
leads to a consistent estimate of the coe¢ cient of the civil war variable, ￿, as long as the
instruments of civil war are uncorrelated with the error term. Nevertheless, for completeness,
Table 2 shows estimates of equation (12). The estimated coe¢ cients in Column I are obtained
from 2SLS with the same instruments as in Column I of Table 1. The coe¢ cient of the
civil war variable is still negative, quantitatively very similar to the estimates in Table 1,
but now signi￿cant only at the 10% con￿dence level. Perhaps more importantly, the weak
identi￿cation statistics is quite low, which suggests caution in interpreting these estimates.
Column II and III of Table 2 instead report estimates of (12) obtained from the GMM
procedure of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) (ABBB-GMM). As
is well known, this ABBB-GMM procedure involves taking ￿rst di⁄erences of equation (12)
and then estimating the level equation and the ￿rst-di⁄erenced equation jointly. Endogene-
ity is dealt with by using the lagged values of the ￿rst di⁄erences as instruments in the
level equation and the lagged levels as instruments in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced equation. A key
identifying assumption is that the errors in levels are not serially correlated, which in turn
means that there should be no autocorrelation of second error in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced errors.14
A test of autocorrelation is reported at the bottom of the Table. In Column II, all the
14By construction, there is going to be ￿rst order autocorrelation in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced errors. However, if
the errors in levels are not serially correlated, then the second order autocorrelation of the ￿rst di⁄erences
should be statistically insign￿cant.
19variables have the expected sign and pass a zero restriction test at usual con￿dence levels.
There is however evidence of non-zero second order autocorrelation in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced
residuals. Consequently, in Column III the model is re-estimated allowing for two lags of the
dependent variable. The estimates are qualitatively similar to those presented in Column II,
but the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of second order now cannot be rejected. Also
note that the Hansen J test indicates that the overidentfying restrictions are valid in both
Columns II and III. The bottom line is that even when allowing for mean reversion, civil
war has a residual negative e⁄ect on per-capita income after controlling for various other
deep determinants.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
3.2 Institutional quality equation
2SLS estimates of equation (8) are shown in Table 3. To start with, Column I presents a very
parsimonious speci￿cation. In addition to the civil war variable, the model includes the index
of malaria ecology and distance from the equator. The theoretical rationale for the use of
malaria ecology follows from the argument of Acemoglu et al. (2001) discussed in Subsection
2.4. The latitude of a country instead has been previously used in regressions of institutional
quality to control for generic geographical e⁄ects (see La Porta et al.1999). The equation
is exactly identi￿ed, since the civil war variable is for now instrumented only by the log of
country area. The estimated coe¢ cients indicate that a worse malaria ecology e⁄ectively
reduces the quality of institutions. The e⁄ect of civil war is negative and signi￿cant, albeit
economically not very large: one additional year of civil war that causes 1000 battle related
deaths reduces the measure of institutional quality by just a bit more than 2 percentage
points. Measured at the sample average of institutional quality, this e⁄ect implies a decline in
20institutional quality of about 4.5%. However, given the estimated coe¢ cients in Column I of
Table 1, this translates into a further decline of about 7% in per-capita GDP. The diagnostic
tests seem to indicate that the equation is neither unidenti￿ed nor weakly identi￿ed.
In Column II, the set of regressors also includes dummy variables for legal origins. Fol-
lowing the argument of La Porta et al. (1995), ￿ve di⁄erent legal origins are coded: English,
French, Scandinavian, German, and Socialist. The English common law was originally es-
tablished as a tool to protect the Parliament and the citizens from the abuse of power of the
Crown. Therefore, countries in this legal tradition should, other things being equal, have
stronger enforcement of property rights and contracts. A similar argument can be made for
countries in the German and Scandinavian legal origin. Conversely, the French civil code was
more of a tool for the State to take greater control of economic activities, which would imply
weaker institutions. Finally, the socialist law, which was explicitly aimed at enforcing State￿ s
control of the economy, should produce weakest institutions. The estimated coe¢ cients of
the dummy variables are all signi￿cant and con￿rm the theoretical predictions. The coe¢ -
cients of the malaria ecology index and the civil war variable are qualitatively unchanged.
The inclusion of other instruments for civil war does not alter these results. Estimates are
reported in Column III and all of the tests support, once again, the identi￿cation strategy.
The equation has also been estimated including two other possible determinants of in-
stitutional quality (results are not reported in the table to save space, but are available
upon request). One is the settlers￿mortality rate. Its correlation with the malaria ecology
index is high and this in turn generates a multicollinearity problem. In fact, when excluding
malaria ecology, the coe¢ cient of settler￿ s mortality is negative and highly signi￿cant. But
when malaria ecology is also included, then settler￿ s mortality becomes insigni￿cant, while
malaria ecology is signi￿cant at the 1% con￿dence level. This piece of evidence is consistent
21with what previously reported about the superior statistical performance of malaria ecology
as an instrument for institutions in the income equation. The other potential determinant
of institutional quality is ethnolinguistic fractionalization. However, when entered in a re-
gression that also controls for malaria ecology and/or legal origins, this variable always fails
to pass a zero restriction. This supports the choice of not using ethnicity to instrument
institutional quality in the income equation.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
3.3 Education equation
Table 4 presents the 2SLS estimates of the education equation (9). The baseline model
controls for two factors that previous theoretical and empirical literature indicates as key
determinants of public goods provision: ethnic fragmentation and (the log of) population
density. Ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of free-riding and reduces the amount of
taxes that individuals are prepared to allocate to the supply of public goods. A negative
relationship between ethnic fragmentation and public goods is reported in the literature for
various types of public goods, including education (see Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina
et al. 1999; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). The e⁄ect of population density instead is more
ambiguous (see, Ladd, 1992 and Hortas-Rico and Sole-Olle, 2010). On the one hand, a
higher population density should increase the cost of publicly provided goods and reduce
the value of receiving them. On the other hand, economies of scale may lead to declining
average supply costs in large and densely populated areas.
Clearly, having included population density as a regressor, land area (which is the denom-
inator of population density) cannot be used as a valid instrument for civil war. Therefore,
in Column I, civil war is instrument by the elevation di⁄erence variable and the equation is
22exactly identi￿ed. The negative e⁄ect of ethnic fragmentation is large and highly signi￿cant,
supporting the use of this variable as an instrument for education in the income equation.
Conversely, neither civil war nor population density seem to matter. In Column II the set
of regressors is extended to include a dummy variable for resource intensive economies. Be-
cause the resource sector is generally not intensive in skilled labour, return on education in
resource rich economies is low and hence individuals have less incentive to attend school.
The negative estimated coe¢ cient of the dummy variable con￿rms this hypothesis. At the
same time, the coe¢ cients of the other three variables do not signi￿cantly change.
While the diagnostics of identi￿cation and weak identi￿cation are satisfactory, one might
suspect that the lack of signi￿cance of the war variable could be related to the fact that land
area cannot be used as an instrument. Luckily, population density appears to be insigni￿cant
in both Column I and Column II. Therefore, it can be dropped from the equation without
running into an omitted variable problem. This in turn allows civil war to be instrumented
by land area. The estimates of this new version of the education equation are reported in
Column III. The coe¢ cient of the civil war variable still does not pass the zero restriction
test, meaning that civil war has a negligible e⁄ect on education. As discussed in the next
section, introducing lags of the civil war variable does not modify this ￿nding. In conclusion,
it would appear that no negative e⁄ect of civil war on per-capita income is transmitted via
education.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
3.4 Trade equation
Table 5 reports the 2SLS estimates of the trade equation (10). In addition to the civil war
variable, the regression includes the measure of remoteness discussed in Section 2 and other
23geographical controls. Given that the remoteness variable already accounts for physical
distance, the two remaining geographical dimensions that are likely to matter are size and
access to the sea. Column I presents the model that includes land area as the relevant
geographical variable and civil war is instrumented by elevation di⁄erence. The remoteness
variable has the expected negative coe¢ cient, signi￿cant at the 1% con￿dence level. This
con￿rms the relevance of remoteness as an instrument for trade. Civil war has the expected
negative e⁄ect on trade: one additional year of civil war that causes 1000 deaths reduces
average trade by about 6 percentage points of GDP. Evaluated at the average of trade, this
e⁄ect corresponds to a decrease in trade integration of about 9%. Note however that because
trade integration is not signi￿cant in the income equation, this trade-reducing e⁄ect of civil
war is likely to have only negligible e⁄ects on per-capita income.
Given that land area is not signi￿cant in Column I, it can be dropped from the list of
regressors and used as an additional instrument of civil war. This overidenti￿ed equation
is estimated in Column II and results are qualitatively very similar to those in Column I.
The test statistics also con￿rm that the equation is not underidenti￿ed or weakly identi￿ed
and that the instruments of war are exogenous. In Column III, a dummy for landlocked
countries is introduced as a proxy for access to the sea. Its estimated coe¢ cient implies that,
everything else being equal, lack of access to the sea reduces trade by about 12 percentage
points of GDP. The e⁄ect of landlockedness is therefore almost twice as strong as the e⁄ect
of one year of civil war. The inclusion of the landlocked dummy variable however does not
change the evidence on the role of remoteness and civil war.
Column IV shows the results of an experiment that probably deserves further attention
in future research. Using data from Spalaore and Wacziarg (2009), a measure of genetic
proximity between the domestic country i and every other country in the sample. This
24measure is the weighted average of the inverse bilateral distance between country i and each
other country in the sample, with weights equal to the aggregate GDP of the other country.
The expectation is that two countries with more diverse cultures and values will also trade
less intensively. The evidence seems to provide at least some support for this hypothesis.
The coe¢ cient of the genetic variable is positive and signi￿cant, albeit at the 10% con￿dence
level only. In fact, aggregating bilateral genetic distances over all countries might admittedly
weaken the statistical strength of the relationship between genetic proximity and economic
integration. Nevertheless, the genetic variable might be an additional valid and relevant
instrument for trade integration. The results concerning the other variables are qualitatively
una⁄ected by the inclusion of the genetic variable, even though the estimated coe¢ cient of
the civil war variable somewhat increases in absolute value.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
4. System estimates
The equations of the structural model are now re-estimated using a system estimator that
allows the errors across equations to be correlated. Traditionally, system estimation uses
a 3SLS estimator. However, the underlying assumption that errors are i.i.d. is likely to
be violated in this case. Therefore, the system is estimated using a GMM procedure that
corrects for heterosckedasticity. In fact, it can be shown that the standard 3SLS estimator
is a special case of the GMM estimator (see Wooldridge, 2002).
Results are presented in Table 6, for the system of exactly identi￿ed equations (corre-
sponding to the equations in Columns I of Tables 1,3,4, and 5), and Table 7, for the system
of overidenti￿ed equations (corresponding to the equations in Column II of Table 1, Columns
III of Tables 3 and 4, and Column IV of Table 5). As can be seen, the equation-by-equation
25results are con￿rmed. In particular, civil war negatively a⁄ects institutions and trade, but
not education. Moreover, trade is not a signi￿cant determinant of per-capita income, so that
in the end the only statistically relevant transmission channel is through institutional quality.
The residual direct of civil war on per-capita income, after accounting for the transmission
via the other deep determinants, is negative and strongly signi￿cant. Using the estimated
coe¢ cients in Table 6 as a reference, one additional year of civil war that causes a 1000
battle related deaths reduces the ￿ve year average of per-capita income by approximately
15.5%. Of this, slightly more than 6% is due to the adverse e⁄ect of war on the quality of
institutions. The remaining 9% is due to the direct e⁄ect of war on per-capita income. The
coe¢ cients in Table 7 imply marginally smaller e⁄ects: the ￿ve year average of per-capita
GDP declines by approximately 14%, of which just a bit more than 5.5% is accounted for
by the institutional channel. Overall, these income e⁄ects are quantitatively very close to
these obtained from the equation-by-equation estimates and suggest that the institutional
channel accounts for something between one-third and one-half of the total loss in per-capita
income.
INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE
The system estimated in Table 7 is then used to analyze three important extensions
concerning (i) lagged e⁄ects of civil war, (ii) the spatial e⁄ects of civil war, and (iii) the
inclusion of per-capita income in the other equations of the system. Table 8 reports a
summary of the results concerning these extension. To avoid overloading the presentation,
only the coe¢ cients of the war variables (and of per-capita income) are shown in the Table.15
To start with, the ￿rst three raws of the table (panel A) provide evidence on the lagged
e⁄ects (r = 0;1;2) of civil war.16 The pattern of coe¢ cients on the war variables is
15The coe¢ cients of the other variables can be obtained upon request
16
26quite consistent: the contemporaneous e⁄ect is negative and signi￿cant in all equations,
except the education equation. Then, the one-period lagged e⁄ect is positive, smaller than
the contemporaneous e⁄ect, and signi￿cant in all equations, again except the education
equation. The two-period lagged e⁄ect is negative, but generally very small and signi￿cant
only in the income equation. This pattern suggests two main conclusions. First, a country
a› icted by a civil war su⁄ers signi￿cant economic costs in the quinquennium during which
the war occurs, but already rebounds in the subsequent quinquennium. However, in the
rebound, the country recovers only about one half of the economic loss due to the war. This
means that the cumulated income loss associated with a civil war remains negative even after
the rebound period. Second, the economic e⁄ects of a civil war tend to become negligible
after a period of ten/￿fteen years from the occurrence of the war. This timeline suggests an
interesting interpretation for another key ￿nding reported in the literature on post-con￿ ict
risk (see Collier et al. 2008). This literature shows that the risk of a new con￿ ict is very
high throughout the ￿rst ten years that follow the end of a previous war, but then rapidly
declines. The evidence in Table 8 suggests that the reason why it takes about a decade for
post-con￿ ict risk to decline may be that it takes about ten years (possibly a bit longer) for
the bad economic legacy of the con￿ ict to vanish. The relationship between post-con￿ ict
risk and economic cost of con￿ ict is certainly an interesting avenue of future research.
The next two raws (panel B) of Table 8 present the evidence on the spatial e⁄ects of
civil war. There are various reasons why domestic country i might be a⁄ected by a con￿ ict
happening in some neighbor country j. For instance, the war in j might disrupt trade routes
The number of lags R = 2 has been chosen using a general-to-speci￿c approach. The system was initially
estimated for R = 4, but the four-period lagged war variable was not signi￿ciant in any of the four equations.
Then, the system was estimated for R = 3 and again the three-period lagged war variable failed to be
signi￿cant in all equations. Finally, the system was estimated for R = 2 and the two-period lagged war
variable turned out signi￿cant in at least one equation. Given the limited time dimension of the panel,
setting R > 4 would imply that few observations are available for estimation and this in turn makes statistical
inference very unreliable.
27of country i or cause large movements of refugees that a⁄ect the ability of the domestic
government to deliver public goods and services (including security). To capture these
e⁄ects, a variable that measures the intensity of civil wars in the region is added to the r.h.s.
in all the four equations of the model. For the generic country i, this variable is de￿ned as
PS
j=1 wjt where wjt is the civil war variable in generic neighbor country j and S is the total
number of neighbors of country i. The neighbors of country i are simply those countries that
share a land border with country i. The estimated coe¢ cient of this variable turns out to
be insigni￿cant in the three regressions of the deep determinants. In the income regression,
instead, it is positive and signi￿cant, albeit only at the 10% con￿dence level. A tentative
interpretation for this ￿nding is that when a country falls into war, part of its entrepreneurial
know-how and skills migrate to a peaceful neighbor country, so that this peaceful neighbor
experiences a boost in production. Clearly, more theoretical and empirical work on this
hypothesis is needed in the future.17 At the same time, the coe¢ cients of domestic civil
war remain signi￿cant (and negative) in the income, institutions, and trade equations.
The last four raws (panels C and D) of the table are obtained from a speci￿cation of the
model that includes (the log of) per-capita income as a regressor in equations (8), (9), and
(10). Richer and economically more advanced countries (that is, countries with a higher per-
capita GDP) might be better able to a⁄ord good institutions, to provide public education and
other public goods, and to engage in international trade. Econometrically, the problem of
estimating the equations with per-capita income as a regressor is to ￿nd a suitable instrument
for per-capita income. The 2SLS estimates of equation (7) presented in Table 1 indicate that
the dummy for landlocked country and resource abundance may be relevant, in the sense
17There might also be some collinearity between domestic civil war and regional civil war. Intuitively,
contagion e⁄ects may imply that the domestic country is at greater risk of civil war if its neighbrous are
already involved in a civil war. Empirically, however, the correlation between the two variables is not
particularly strong (0.34).
28that they are likely to be strongly correlated with per-capita income. However, landlocked
directly a⁄ects trade and resource dependence directly a⁄ects education, so that per-capita
income would have to be instrumented by di⁄erent variables in di⁄erent equations. An
alternative identi￿cation strategy relies on the use of the lagged ￿rst di⁄erence of per-capita
income as an instrument. The underlying logic is similar to the identi￿cation strategy of
the level equation in the ABBB-GMM estimator. The results are reported in panel C of
Table 8. As can be seen, very little changes in equations (8) and (9): per-capita GDP is
not statistically signi￿cant while the coe¢ cients of the civil war variable are qualitatively
similar to those reported in Table 7. More relevant changes are instead observed in equation
(10), where per-capita GDP appears to be strongly signi￿cant and its inclusion reduces
the strength and statistical signi￿cance of the e⁄ect of civil war. Another way to estimate
the equations with per-capita income as a regressor is to apply the ABBB-GMM estimator
equation-by-equation. Results are reported in panel D of Table 8.18 The evidence on the
e⁄ect of civil war is still quite strong. In fact, these results would suggest that the adverse
e⁄ect of civil war on education is also statistically signi￿cant.
5. Conclusions
The assessment of the economic cost of con￿ ict is generally based on the estimation of a
reduced form model where per-capita income is regressed on a measure of civil war and
a set of other controls. However, if civil war a⁄ects per-capita income through its e⁄ect
on (some of) the other controls, then this reduced form model is inadequate to provide a
correct representation of the cost of con￿ ict. Excluding from the regression the controls
that are a⁄ected by civil war does not solve the problem, as it might produce an omitted
variables bias. This paper takes a di⁄erent methodological route and estimates a system of
18For the income equation, the results are the same as those reported in Column II of Table 2.
29equations. Drawing on a simple motivating theory, the system models the e⁄ect of civil war
on per-capita income via three possible channels: institutional quality, trade integration, and
education. In addition, the system allows for a residual direct e⁄ect of civil war on income.
The equations of the system are estimated ￿rst separately, using 2SLS equation-by-equation,
and then jointly, using a GMM procedure. In both cases, civil war is instrumented by a set
of geographical variables and diagnostics tests on the validity of this choice of instruments
are presented.
Some interesting results are obtained. Civil war negatively a⁄ects institutional quality
and trade integration, while its e⁄ect on education is statistically negligible. Because trade
integration turns out not to be a signi￿cant determinant of per-capita income after control-
ling for institutions (and education), institutional quality remains the only relevant channel
of transmission of the e⁄ect of civil war. However, the residual direct e⁄ect of civil war,
which is the e⁄ect of civil war on per-capita income after controlling for institutions, trade,
and education, is negative and highly signi￿cant. All in all, one year of civil war that causes
1000 battle related deaths reduces the ￿ve-year period average of per-capita GDP by about
15%. The institutional channel accounts for no more than one half of this e⁄ect. The rest is
due to the residual direct e⁄ect. The estimates also indicate that a country a› icted by civil
war in a given quinquennium rebounds relatively quickly in the subsequent quinquennium.
Furthermore, any e⁄ect of civil war appears to vanish by the third (possibly second) quin-
quennium after the civil war. Finally, the evidence concerning the cost of a civil war and
the transmission channels is robust to accounting for spatial e⁄ects of regional con￿ ict and
feedback e⁄ects of per-capita income on institutions, education, and trade integration.
From a policy perspective, the results of this paper suggest that re-building institutions
is a key priority to bu⁄er the disruptive e⁄ect of a con￿ ict on per-capita income. From
30a research perspective, future work should investigate whether the residual direct e⁄ect of
civil war e⁄ectively operates through the disruption of physical capital or, instead, some
other mechanism is at work. Another interesting extension of this research should look into
the relationship between the stabilization of peace after a civil war and the resilience of
the negative e⁄ects of the civil war. The risk of a new civil war drastically declines after
the post-con￿ ict decade. At the same time, the economic e⁄ects of a civil war become
statistically negligible ten to ￿fteen years after the war. The similarity between the two
timelines suggests that there might be connections worth studying.
316. Appendix: Variables description and summary statistics.
Variable De￿nition (Source) Mean Std.dev
civil war Number of years of civil war times battle related deaths. Source: 2.76 9.36
Uppsula/PRIO database
institutions Contract intensive money: M2 - currency in circulation outside .48 .227
bank, in percent of M2 (Clague et al.1999). Source: computed
from WDI data
education Average number of years of schooling. Source: Barro and Lee 4.77 2.85
(2010)
trade Exports + Imports, in percent of GDP. Source: computed .75 .43
from WDI data
latitude Absolute value of country￿ s latitude. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) .28 .19
landlocked Dummy variable = 1 if country is landlocked. Source: coded from .19 .39
information provided in CIA World Factbook
Natural Dummy variable = 1 if country￿ s exports of natural resources (in .52 .48
resources percent of total exports) is greater than sample average. Source:
coded from WDI data
malaria ecology Index of the stability of malaria transmission. Source: Kiszewski 3.68 6.44
et al. 2004
Non- Dummy variable = 1 if country has a non-contiguous territory .16 .36
contiguous (i.e. an enclave separated by sea or land from the rest of the state)
Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003)
32Variable De￿nition (Source) Mean Std.dev
elevation Di⁄erence between country￿ s highest and lowest elevation in 3038 2017
di⁄erence meters. Source: Fearon and Laitin
land_area (log of) land area in km2: Source: WDI 10.73 2.42
remoteness Average (log) distance (in 000 km) between a country and the 0.91 0.24
other countries in the sample
ethnic Probability that two randomly selected individuals do not .35 .28
fragmentation belong with the same ethnic group. Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
per-capita (Log of) per-capita GDP, constant US dollars. Source: WDI 7.72 1.51
income
legal UK Dummy variable = 1 if country￿ s legal tradition is English. .37 .47
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
legal Scandinav. Dummy variable = 1 if country￿ s legal tradition is Scandinavian. .03 .16
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
legal German Dummy variable = 1 if country￿ s legal tradition is German. .03 .17
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
legal socialist Dummy variable = 1 if country￿ s legal tradition is socialist .17 .38
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
Population (log of) population/area. Source: computed from WDI data -9.12 1.62
density
genetic proximity Average of the inverse of bilateral genetic distances between 1.14 0.38
a country and all the others in the sample. Source: computed
from data in Spalaore and Wacziarg (2009)
Note: WDI is the World Development of the World Bank (2010 issue). CIA World Factobook is
33the 2010 edition of the CIA World Factbook available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/ . The other sources are listed in the list of references.
347. List of references
Abadie, Alberto, and Javier Gardeazabal, "The economic costs of con￿ ict: a case study of
the Basque country," American Economic Review 93 (2003),113-132.
Abadie, Alberto, and Javier Gardeazabal, "Terroris and the world economy", European
Economic Review 52 (2008), 1-27.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The colonial origins of com-
parative development: an empirical investigation," American Economic Review 91 (2001),
1369-1401.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly, "Public Goods and Ethnic Divi-
sions.￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1999) 1243￿ 84.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly, "Redistributive Government Em-
ployment," Journal of Urban Economics 48 (2000), 219-241.
Alexeev, Michael, and Robert Conrad, "The elusive curse of oil," Revue of Economics
and Statistics 91 (2009), 568-598.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Jorn-Ste⁄en Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics (Princeton
University Press, 2009).
Arellano, Manuel, and Olympia Bover, "Another look at the instrumental variable esti-
mation of error components models," Journal of Econometrics 68 (1995), 29-51.
Barro Robert J, and Jong-Wha Lee, "A new data set of educational attainment in the
world, 1950-2010" NBER Working Paper No. 15902 (2010).
Bhattacharyya Sambit, "Root causes of African underdevelopment." Journal of African
Economies 18 (2009), 745-780.
Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel, "War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra
Leone," American Economic Review 96 (2006) 394￿ 99.
35Besley, Timothy J., and Torsten Persson, "The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and
Evidence," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14585 (2008)
Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature
48 (2010), 3-57.
Blomberg, Brock S., Gregory D. Hess, Athanasios Orphanides, "The Macroeconomic
Consequences of Terrorism", Journal of Monetary Economics 51 (2004), 1007-1032
Blundell, Richard, and Steve Bond, "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dy-
namic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics 87 (1998), 115-143.
Bozzoli, Carlos, Tillman Bruck, and Simon Sottsas, "A survey of the global economic
costs of con￿ ict," Defence and Peace Economics 21 (2010), 165-176
Bruck Tilman, "Mozambique: the Economic E⁄ects of the War," In F. Stewart and V.
Fitzgerald, eds. War and Underdevelopment vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2001).
Brunnschweiler, Christa, and Erwin Bulte, "The resource curve revisited and revised: A
tale of paradoxes and red herrings", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
55 (2008), 248-264.
Carmignani, Fabrizio, "The impact of ￿scal policy on private consumption and social
outcomes in ￿scal policy in Europe and the CIS," Journal of Macroeconomics 30 (2008),
575-598.
Carmignani, Fabrizio, "The making of pro-poor growth," Forthcoming Scottish Journal
of Political Economy.
Carmignani, Fabrizio, and Adrian Gauci, Peace After Civil War: The Role of Fiscal
Policy in Post-Con￿ict African Economies (Nova Publisher, 2010).
Cerra, Valerie and Sweta C. Saxena, "Growth dynamics: The myth of economic recov-
ery," American Economic Review 98 (2008), 439-457.
36Chen, Siyan, Norman V. Loayza, and Marta Reynal-Querol, "The aftermath of civil
war", Post-Con￿ ict Transitions Working Paper No 4 (2007). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Ciccone, Antonio, "Transitory Economic Shocks and Civil Con￿ ict,￿Unpublished (2008).
Clague Cristopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson, "Contract inten-
sive money: contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance," Journal of
Economic Growth 1 (1999), 363-389.
Collier, Paul, "On the economic consequences of civil war," Oxford Economic Papers 51
(1999), 168-183.
Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliott, H￿vard Hegre, Anke Hoe› er, Marta Reynal-Querol, and
Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Con￿ict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. (Wash-
ington, D.C.: World Bank; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoe› er, Mans Soderbom "Post-Con￿ ict Risks," Journal of Peace
Research, 45 (2008), 461-478.
Easterly William, and Ross Levine, "Africa￿ s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divi-
sion," Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997), 1203-1250.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American
Political Science Review 97 (2003), 75￿ 90.
Fitzgerald Valpy, Frances Stewart, Michael Wang, "An overview of the case studies." In
F. Stewart and V. Fitzerald, eds. War and Underdevelopment vol. 2 (Oxford University
Press, 2001).
Frankel, Je⁄rey, and David Romer "Does Trade Cause Growth?," American Economic
Review 89 (1999) 379-385.
Frankel, Je⁄rey, and Andrew K. Rose, "An estimate of the e⁄ect of common currencies
on trade and income," Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002), 437-466.
37Gardeazabak, Javier, "Methods for measuring aggregate costs of con￿ ict", DAFEII Work-
ing Papers 201009 (2010), University of Basque Country.
Glaeser Edward L., Rafael La Porta., Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer "Do
institutions cause growth?," Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2004), 271-303.
Gleditsch, Nils P., Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and H￿vard
Strand, "Armed Con￿ ict 1946￿ 2001: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002),
615￿ 37.
Glick Reuven, and Alan M. Taylor, "Collateral damage: Trade disruption and the eco-
nomic impact of war," Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (2010), 102-127.
Imbs, Jean, "Trade, ￿nance, specialization and synchronization," Review of Economics
and Statistics 86 (2004), 723-734.
Hall, Robert H., and Charles I. Jones, "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output Per Worker Than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83-116.
Hayashi, Fumio, Econometrics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)
Hortas-Rico, Miriam, and Albert Sole-Olle, "Does Urban Sprawl Increases the Costs of
Providing Local Public Services? Evidence from Spanish Municipalities," Urban Studies 47
(2010), 1513-1540.
Huang, Ho-Chuan, Yi-Chen Lin, and Chih-Chuan Yeh, "Joint determinants of inequality
and growth," Economic Letters 103 (2009), 163-166
Kiszewski Anthony, Andrew Mellinger, Andrew Spielman, Pia Malaney, Sonia E. Sachs,
and Je⁄rey Sachs, "A Global Index Representing the Stability of Malaria Transmission,"
American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygene 70 (2004), 486-498.
Kleibergen, Frank, and Richard Papp, "Generalized Reduced Rank Tests Using the Sin-
gular Value Decomposition," Journal of Econometrics 133 (2006), 97-126.
38Ladd, Helen, "Population Growth, Density, and the Costs of Providing Public Services",
Urban Studies, 29, (1992), 273-295.
La Porta Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "The
quality of government," Journal of Law and Economic Organizations 15 (1999) 222-279.
Lopez, Humberto, and Quentin Wodon, "The economic impact of armed con￿ ict in
Rwanda," Journal of African Economies 14 (2005), 586-602.
Lundberg, Mattias, and Lyn Squire "The simultaneous evolution of growth and inequal-
ity," Economic Journal 113 (2003), 326-344.
Magee, Christopher, and Tansa G. Massoud, "Openness and internal con￿ ict," Journal
of Peace Research, 48 (2011), 59-72.
Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty, "Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public
Goods in Kenya," Journal of Public Economics, 89 (2005), 2325￿ 2368.
Miguel, Edward, and Gerald Roland, "The Long Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam.￿
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11954 (2006).
Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti, "Economic Shocks and Civil
Con￿ ict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Journal of Political Economy 112 (2004),
725￿ 753.
Nunn Nathan, "The long-term e⁄ects of Africa￿ s slave trades," Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123 (2008), 139-176.
Rodrik, Dani, "Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Con￿ ict, and
Growth Collapses," Journal of Economic Growth, 4 (1999), 385￿ 412.
Rodrik, Dani, "Institutions, Integration and Geography: in Search of the Deep Determi-
nants of Economic Growth" (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/growthintro.pdf,
2002)
39Rodrik Dani, Arvind Subramanian A, and Francesco Trebbi, "Institutions rule: the
primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development," Journal
of Economic Growth 9 (2004), 131-165.
Sachs, Je⁄ry, 2003 Institutions don￿ t rule: direct e⁄ects of geography on per capita
income. NBER Working Paper 9490, (2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9490.
Sambanis, Nicholas, "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an
Operational De￿nition," Journal of Con￿ict Resolution 48 (2004), 814￿ 858.
Skaperdas, Stergios, "The costs of organized violence: a review of the evidence", Eco-
nomics of Governance, 12 (2011), 1-23.
Spalaore Enrico, and Robert Wacziarg, "The Di⁄usion of Development", Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 124 (2009), 469-530.
Stewart Frances, Cheng Huang, Michael Wang M "Internal wars in developing countries:
an empirical overview of economic and social consequences," In F. Stewart and V. Fitzerald,
eds. War and Underdevelopment vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2001).
Stock, Janes H., and Motohiro Yogo, "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Re-
gression," in D.W.K. Andrews and J.H. Stock, eds. Identi￿cation and
Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
Yamarik, Steven, Noel Johnson, and Ryan A. Compton, "War! What is it good for?
A deep determinants analysis of the cost of interstate con￿ ict," Peace Economics, Peace
Science and Public Policy 16 (2010) Article 8.
Wooldridge, Je⁄rey, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2002)
World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Con￿ict, Security, and Development,
40(Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2011).
418. Tables
Table 1. Baseline income equation, 2SLS results
I II III IV
institutions 3.191*** 4.033*** 2.878** 2.123**
education .356*** .296*** .335*** .384***
trade -.555 -.692 -.599 -.463
war -.083*** -.083*** -.092*** -.077***
latitude .277 1.304 1.185 .817
landlocked -.412** -.543*** -.503***
nat. resources .559*** .444*** .371**
constant 4.556*** 3.938*** 4.495*** 4.592***
N. Obs 484 484 484 484
J stat (pval) 3.196 (0.2) 3.198 (0.2) 19.769(0.06) 23.710(0.02)
LM stat. 13.319*** 18.522*** 13.828** 18.348***
First stage
Chi-sq F Chi-sq F Chi-sq F Chi-sq F
institutions 39.28*** 12.88 30.57*** 9.98 38.18*** 7.45 42.14*** 6.83
education 33.30*** 10.92 45.61*** 14.89 60.73*** 11.85 58.91*** 12.36
trade 214.7*** 70.38 129.46*** 42.26 184.45*** 36.00 211.17*** 34.25
war 13.40*** 10.15 19.96*** 10.38 17.94*** 10.09 20.02*** 10.11
(critical value) (9.08) (9.08) (10.83) (11.12)
Notes: 2SLS with robust standard errors. Included instruments: latitude, landlocked, and natural
resources. Instrumented: institutions, education, trade, war. Excluded instruments: malaria ecology, non-
contiguous, elevation di⁄erence, land area, remoteness, ethnic fragmentation. In column III legal origins
42replace malaria ecology as excluded instruments. In column IV both legal origins and malaria ecology are
added as excluded instruments. J stat os the Hansen statistic for the overidenti￿cation test of all instruments;
H0 is that the overidentfying restrictions are valid; the relevant p-value is in brackets. LM stat is based on
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) for the null hypothesis that the model is underidenti￿ed. First stage chi-squared and
F statistics are tests of underidenti￿cation and weak identi￿cation, respectively, of individual endogenous
regressors (based on Angrist and Pischke). For the F-statistic, the critical value from Stock-Yogo (2002,
2005) is reported for comparative purposes. *,**,*** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
con￿dence level respectively.
43Table 2, Income equation with mean reversion, 2SLS results and ABBB-GMM estimates
I II III
institutions .544*** .057*** .154***
education .054** .010*** .006***
trade -.146 .036* .031**
war -.095* -.002*** -.001***
latitude .204* 1.279*** .791***
landlocked -.107*** -.183*** -.092***
nat. resources .031 .010** -.001
1 lag gdp pc .849*** .862*** 1.180***
2 lag gdp pc .. .. -.291***
constant .678*** .713*** .537***
N. Obs. 403 438 352
J stat (pval) 0.78 (0.67) 74.17 (0.87) 70.607 (0.69)
LM stat. 4.998* ... ...
AC order 1 .. -3.582*** -4.349***
AC order 2 .. -3.169*** -1.406
First Stage
Chi-sq F Chi-sq F Chi-sq F
institutions 34.32*** 11.13 .. .. .. ..
education 17.78*** 5.76 .. .. .. ..
trade 199.36*** 64.6 .. .. .. ..
war 7.12** 7.47 .. .. .. ..
(critical value) 9.08 .. .. .. ..
Notes: 2SLS with robust standard errors in column I. Included instruments: latitude, landlocked, natural
44resources, and lagged per capita GDP. Instrumented: institutions, education, trade, war. Excluded instru-
ments: malaria ecology, non-contiguous, elevation di⁄erence, land area, remoteness, ethnic fragmentation.
Arellano-Bond-Bover-Blundell two step GMM estimator in columns II and III. The AC test is the Arellano-
Bond test for zero autocorrelation in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced errors. *,**,*** denote statistical signi￿cance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% con￿dence level respectively.
45Table 3. Institutional quality equation, 2SLS results
I II III
war -.022*** -.018*** -.020***
latitude .044 -.007 -.042
malaria ecol. -.0133*** -.0131*** -.0134***
legal UK .. .147*** .141***
legal Scand .. .092* .052
legal Germ .. .121*** .115***
legal Soc .. -.086** -.073*
const -.603*** .535*** .556***
N. Obs 951 951 855
J stat (pval) .. .. 0.2 (0.6)
LM stat. 42.99*** 42.61*** 28.76***
First Stage
Chi-sq F Chi-sq F Chi-sq F
war 47.89*** 47.69 47.06*** 46.66 32.12*** 15.89
critical value (16.38) (16.38) 19.93
Notes: 2SLS with robust standard errors. Included instruments: latitude, malaria ecology, and legal
origins. Instrumented: war. Excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence. In column III land area is added
to elevation di⁄erent. J stat os the Hansen statistic for the overidenti￿cation test of all instruments; H0
is that the overidentfying restrictions are valid; the relevant p-value is in brackets. LM stat is based on
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) for the null hypothesis that the model is underidenti￿ed. First stage chi-squared and
F statistics are tests of underidenti￿cation and weak identi￿cation, respectively, of individual endogenous
regressors (based on Angrist and Pischke). For the F-statistic, the critical value from Stock-Yogo (2002,
462005) is reported for comparative purposes. *,**,*** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
con￿dence level respectively.
47Table 4. Education equation, 2SLS results
I II III
war -.0082 -.086 -.049
ethnic frag -4.274*** -3.167*** -3.245***
pop density .075 -.151 ..
Nat. resources .. -2.004*** -1.989***
const 6.181*** 8.633*** 7.669***
N. Obs 715 616 690
J stat (pval) .. .. 1.782 (0.18)
LM stat. 18.321*** 17.499*** 20.236***
First stage
Chi-sq F Chi-sq F Chi-sq F
war 19.63*** 19.52 18.39*** 18.24 21.98*** 20.91
critical value (16.38) (16.38) 19.93
Notes: 2SLS with robust standard errors. Included instruments: ethnic fragmentation, population
density, natural resources. Instrumented: war. Excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence. In column III
land area is added to elevation di⁄erent. J stat os the Hansen statistic for the overidenti￿cation test of all
instruments; H0 is that the overidentfying restrictions are valid; the relevant p-value is in brackets. LM
stat is based on Kleibergen-Paap (2006) for the null hypothesis that the model is underidenti￿ed. First
stage chi-squared and F statistics are tests of underidenti￿cation and weak identi￿cation, respectively, of
individual endogenous regressors (based on Angrist and Pischke). For the F-statistic, the critical value from
Stock-Yogo (2002, 2005) is reported for comparative purposes. *,**,*** denote statistical signi￿cance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% con￿dence level respectively.
48Table 5. Trade equation, 2SLS results
I II III IV
war -.063*** -.074*** -.072*** -.079***
remoteness -.030*** -.034*** -.0416*** -.262**
land area -.0162 ... ..
landlocked .. .. -.122* -.156**
genetic prox .229*
const 1.381*** 1.274*** 1.364*** .991***
N. Obs 878 878 878 878
J stat (pval) .. 0.311 (0.57) 0.26 (0.61) 0.233 (0.63)
LM stat. 11.255*** 35.517*** 36.09*** 25.348***
First stage
Chi-sq F Chi-sq F Chi-sq F Chi-sq F
war 11.03*** 18.98 38.24*** 19.03 39.16*** 19.97 27.72*** 21.77
critical value (16.38) (19.93) (19.93) (19.93)
Notes: 2SLS with robust standard errors. Included instruments: remoteness, land area, landlocked,
and genetic proximity. Instrumented: war. Excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence (in all columns) and
land area (in columns II, III, and IV). J stat os the Hansen statistic for the overidenti￿cation test of all
instruments; H0 is that the overidentfying restrictions are valid; the relevant p-value is in brackets. LM
stat is based on Kleibergen-Paap (2006) for the null hypothesis that the model is underidenti￿ed. First
stage chi-squared and F statistics are tests of underidenti￿cation and weak identi￿cation, respectively, of
individual endogenous regressors (based on Angrist and Pischke). For the F-statistic, the critical value from
Stock-Yogo (2002, 2005) is reported for comparative purposes. *,**,*** denote statistical signi￿cance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% con￿dence level respectively.
49Table 6. System of baseline speci￿cations, GMM estimates
I II III IV
Income Institutions Education Trade
latitude .082 0.042 .. ..
institutions 3.034*** .. .. ..
education .369*** .. .. ..
trade -.661 .. .. ..
war -.092*** -.021*** -.004 -.052***
malaria ecol .. -.013*** .. ..
ethnic frag. .. .. -4.289*** ..
pop density .. .. .067 ..
remoteness .. .. .. -.028**
land area .. .. .. -0.29
N. Obs 3003
Notes: GMM estimates with robust standard errors. To save space, estimates of the constant terms are
not reported. J-statistic is 2.21, p-val 0.345.
Column I, income equation. Dependent variable log per-capita GDP. Included instruments: latitude; in-
strumented: institutions, education, trade, and war. Excluded instruments: land area, ethnic fragmentation,
and malaria ecology.
Column II, institutional quality equation. Dependent variable: institutions. Included instruments:
latitude, malaria; instrumented: war ; excluded instruments: land area.
Column III. Education equation. Dependent variable: education. Included instruments: ethnic frag-
mentation, population density; instrumented: war; excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence.
Column IV. Trade equation. Dependent variable: trade. Included instruments: remoteness, land area;
instrumented: war; excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence. *, **, *** denote statistical signi￿cance at
50the 1%, 5%, and 10% con￿dence level respectively.
51Table 7 System of extended speci￿cations, GMM estimates
I II III IV
Income Institutions Education Trade
latitude .987 -.048 .. ..
landlocked -.457** .. .. -.153**
nat. resources .509* .. -1.712*** ..
institutions 3.024** .. .. ..
education .345*** .. .. ..
trade -.785 .. .. ..
war -.086*** -.019*** -.042 -.079***
malaria ecol .. -.013*** .. ..
legal uk .. 0.143*** .. ..
legal scan. .. .062 .. ..
legal ger .. .123*** .. ..
legal soc .. .081** .. ..
ethnic frag. .. .. -3.432*** ..
remoteness .. .. .. -.029**
genetic prox .. .. .. .212*
N. Obs 2847
Notes: GMM estimates with robust standard errors. To save space, estimates of the constant terms are
not reported. J-statistic are as follows: 3.17 (p-val. 0.269),
Column I, income equation. Dependent variable: log per-capita GDP. Included instruments: latitude,
natural resources, landlocked; instrumented: institutions, education, trade, and war. Excluded instruments:
non contiguous, elevation di⁄erence, land area, ethnic fragmentation, and malaria ecology.
Column II, institutional quality equation. Dependent variable: institutions. Included instruments:
52latitude, malaria ecology, legal origins; instrumented: war; excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence, land
area.
Column III, education equation. Dependent variable: education. Included instruments: ethnic fragmen-
tation, natural resources; instrumented: war; excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence, land area.
Column IV, trade equation. Dependent variable: trade. Included instruments: remoteness, landlocked,
genetic proximity; Instrumented: war; excluded instruments: elevation di⁄erence, land area.
*, **, *** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% con￿dence level respectively.
53Table 8 Further extensions
I II III IV
A: Lags of civil war, GMM (system)
war -.097** -.048*** -.112 -.176***
war lag 1 .052* .026** .055 .099**
war lag 2 -.018* -.002 -.002 -.013
B: Domestic and regional war, GMM (system)
war (dom.) -.098*** -.023*** -.061 -.083***
war (reg.) .038* .006 -.021 .017
C: Feedback income e⁄ects, GMM (system)
war -.076*** -.024* -.088 -.018*
Income p.c. .. -.002 -.766 .193***
D: Feedback income e⁄ects, ABBB-GMM (eq-by-eq)
war .. -001*** -.002*** -.002***
Income p.c. .. -.008 .069*** .017*
Notes. Column I, dependent variable is per-capita income, the other regressors (not reported) are
institutions, education, trade, latitude, landlocked, and natural resources. Column II, dependent variable
is institutional quality, the other regressors (not reported) are malaria ecology, legal origins, and latitude.
Column III, dependent variable is education, the other regressors (not reported) are ethnic fragmentation
and natural resources. Column IV, dependent variable is trade, the other regressors (not reported) are
remoteness, landlocked, and genetic distance. System estimates in panels A, B, and C of the table. ABBB-
GMM estimates equation-by-equation in panel D. The instruments for the system estimates are the same as
in Table 7. *, **, *** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% con￿dence level respectively.
54